ARTICLE - NEW DG MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

CAREL ALEXANDER NEW DG OF MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
(Haiti Libre) -

Tuesday, Jean Rodolphe Joazile, the Minister of Defense proceeded to the installation of Mr. Carel Alexandre as the new Director General within the Ministry of Defence. Reputed to be close to President Martelly, Mr. Alexander, a former commander of the Corps of Intervention and Maintenance of Order (CIMO), was the former head of presidential security. Appointed by presidential decree, Mr. Alexander will alongside the Minister play "a coordinating role, of monitoring and as a liaison with all the technical and External Services under the Ministry." During this installation, the Minister and the new Director General presented a speech for the occasion.

Speech of Minister Jean Rodolphe Joazile:"[...] Ladies and Gentlemen;

Dear Carel,

Happiness is elusive!

But at the crossroads of destiny, it can not always be tame. Is it not Carel, that ours is full? Our fates are filled this summer afternoon. We celebrate this reunion in vivifying the trade of Man. Of a Haitien-Man - for a long time we chose to assume this. Of a Citizen-Man as I was, for some time, the privilege to encourage you to be, by bearing you, with the officers of my promotion, towards the profession of arms. Thus guiding your young steps towards honor.

Yes, and I have no doubt of your membership in this option. The first stone of the building will have to fit within the direction of responses to provide for the natural events that overwhelm us too often. They should aim at building the civic spirit and engagement, for the operationalization of the compulsory Joint Civilian Service as indicated by our fundamental charter. In short, they must, these stones, be used to stone the horror in all its forms that will notify of being present in our lives of quiet people.

All this while while progressively there will be built a new defense force whose military mission in peacetime, so ideally at all times, will join fully the accompaniment of civil defense agencies to be determined.

It is there, my dear Carel, exhilarating! Because, this is indeed what it is; by restoring the Ministry of Defence, 'la gaguère' that has taken the legitimate authority, in complete accord with our gods. These tutelary gods to the manna too often ignored, is neither more nor less the reconquest of the sovereign attributes, from which will have come off, with the same panache that recurrent force of the inescapable image of the indigenous armies. Those that made 1804 and gave us this land in legacy.

You join me, my brother, in full battle. And I know that I can rely on you to have and reap victories. Even if every time that we will have the choice of weapons, we will not hesitate to choose those of the dialectic of the mind that have proven themselves enough in the pursuit of life.

In this vein, you will not be surprised by the emphasis that I have decided, initially, to put on the site that awaits you. That, my friend and brother, is the laborious field where I like to invite you, here and now.

That the gods are helping us !"

Jean Rodolphe JOAZILE, Minister

Speech of Carel Alexandre, Director General of the Ministry of Defence:

"Mr. Defense Minister,

Ladies / Gentlemen,

Let me first express my gratitude to the President of the Republic, not only for the confidence he has honored me by making the choice today of myself as the head of the Directorate General of this Ministry, but also for the possibility he gave me to serve once again my country, in an important level of responsibility.

I would be remiss not to give here, to the Prime Minister and to the Head of State, the assurance of my devotion, and the guarantee to put all my knowledge and my skill at the service of this Ministry, and to the benefit of the achieving of the objectives they have defined themselves, as part of their vision of the State, or in the general government policy in defense matters.

I would like also to take this opportunity to express to Minister Jean Rodolphe Joazile my deepest respects and offer my natural, full, and sincere collaboration in the conduct of the actions of this Ministry.

Ladies / Gentlemen,

After almost two decades of suppression of the Ministry of Defence in the Haitian political-administrative structure, it is not surprising, that no one still wonder, in the interest of restoring this regalian feature of the State, in a diplomatic and economic context

However, despite the difficult political and financial considerations of the moment, we must also admit that the defense function, in a country like Haiti, has never been so necessary, imperative, and even vital.

Indeed, because of the emergence of a new national and international phenomena of the State and detrimental to the welfare of citizens, the function of national defense is no longer restricted, in the contemporary world, to protect the civilian population against only the threats foreign military.

In a world beset with terrorism, as well as environmental threats of all kinds, politicians have today, we must recognize it, multidimensional objectives. This is in fact, not only to prevent or suppress the acts of armed violence both internal or external, that threaten the safety of the State policy, but also and especially to protect and assist the civilian population in case of major natural events.

These are exactly as much reasons that justify the necessitate to rehabilitate this Ministry today and that inspires, I have no doubt, the action lines of the current Ministry of Defence. And, it's obvious to this vision, that I will endeavor as Director General of this Ministry."

Carel ALEXANDRE, Director General

ARTICLE - FRANCE - ROAD SAFETY CONTRIBUTION

FRANCE CONTRIBUTES TO ROAD SAFETY
(Haiti Libre) -

In order to reduce the risk of road accidents, Didier Le Bret, the Ambassador of France in Haiti, handed over to officials of the National Police of Haiti (PNH) two speed radars of the latest generation, as well as breathalyser,s at a ceremony at the Police Academy; symbolically ending a two-week training, given by two gendarmes, and a French police officer of the UN Police (UNPOL), on the use of these devices on the road, to 17 instructors of the PNH.

In parallel, the Embassy of France will help train Haitian school children in the rules of pedestrian traffic, from July 27, by beginning with students from the Ecole Jules Verne Pernier, a neighborhood in the Petionville district. This training will include the screening of a documentary film, followed by an open discussion, moderated by a French gendarme of UNPol and distribution of a code of conduct for pedestrians.

According to the Ambassador of France, other projects are underway, including the installation of pedestrian crossings in the capital, and traffic signs along highways to reduce accidents, and save lives.

ARTICLE - POLICE SUMMIT AT PALACE

EXCEPTIONAL SUMMIT OF THE PNH AT THE NATIONAL PALACE
(Haiti Libre) -

At the invitation of President Michel Martelly, the main actors involved in the development of the National Police of Haiti (PNH), have agreed on a Development Plan of the PNH for the period 2012-2016, in the perspective of the implementation of a joint strategy of withdrawal of forces of the MINUSTAH, during an exceptional summit held at the National Palace this Friday, June 29 2012.

Ppresent at the summit were President Martelly, the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior, the two Presidents of the Justice and Security Commissions in Parliament, the Director General of the PNH, Ambassadors and representatives of major donor countries of the PNH, namely: Germany, Brazil, Canada, France, Chile, the United States of America, Spain, Japan, Colombia and Norway, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in Haiti, the Commissioner of the UN Police, and representatives of civil society.

"It is imperative that we strengthen our PNH [National Police of Haiti] because the departure of the MINUSTAH is linked to our ability to maintain order and peace in the country [...] the police is an essential instrument in the establishment of the rule of law and in creating a secure environment attractive for investments that generate employment," declared President Michel Martelly at the opening of the summit.

Mariano Fernández Amunátegui, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, acknowledged that "the time has come for a joint strategy for a gradual withdrawal [of the MINUSTAH], whose role in security matters must be insured by the National Police of Haiti; [...] a withdrawal based on a general improvement in security."

After more than two hours of intense discussions on the difficulties faced by the police institution and the solutions for its strengthening, participants agreed on a "new dynamic to support the development of the PNH," stated Prime Minister, Laurent Lamothe.

On the basis of a presentation made by the Director General of National Police of Haiti, Mario Andrésol, on the 2012-2016 Development Plan of the PNH (prepared jointly with MINUSTAH), the participants have agreed on a gradual increase in the size of the PNH from 10,106 to 15,106 in 2016 (ie 5,000 police officers trained in four years in 6 new promotions) and a yearly gradual increase of 10% in the budget allocated to the National Police.

"By 2016 we need $1.3 billion U.S. dollars to be able to meet the objectives that we have set for ourselves," indicated after the meeting, Lucien Jura, the Spokesman of the Presidency. "The funds must come from the Treasury for 900 million, and from the International Community to just over 400 million", adding that the Summit had also committed on a career plan to "raise the living standards of police officers, with an accompanying salary and benefits [...] to attract a different clientele and have executives better trained, and better prepared, to confront the challenges ahead for the nation."

For his part, Jean-Renel Sanon, the Minister of Justice stated "[...] We were very satisfied with the meeting [...] very pleased with the presentation that the Director General of the National Police of Haiti has done, the various interventions of senators, parliamentarians and of the Civil Society, that we have very much appreciated. [...] We decided to set up a Joint Monitoring Committee, of support to the National Police. Why? Because there is a different new body in the police. We must establish, for example: the Directorate of Border Police, the direction of the rural police and a project for a new rapid reaction force [...] like the 'Swat-Team'."

We discussed these different bodies. The Minister of Justice intervened, the President spoke, all Ambassadors have intervened, and globally we are very satisfied. Now we will set up budgets for all these police forces, and we will work in this Commission with the Supreme Council of the National Police (CSPN), the Presidency, and the 7 Embassies who participate in the Joint Commission [which will start meeting starting next week].

ARTICLE - DON'T RECREATE HAITI'S ARMY

DON'T RECREATE HAITI'S ARMY - ANALYSIS
(Eurasia Review) - By W. Alex Sanchez

Haitian President Michel Martelly finds himself in an increasingly difficult position on the military question. In mid-May, several former army officers met with Martelly and urged him to uphold his presidential campaign promise that, if elected, he would reintroduce the army. But this is one pledge the Haitian president should renege on. The Haitian military is notorious for its history of corruption, violence, and disrespect for human rights. If the army is reconstituted — which would be a worst-case scenario for Haiti — Washington should sharply restrict the security assistance it provides Port-au-Prince in the future.

A Brief History of Violence

Any analysis of the historical instability, corruption, and violence in Haiti must touch on the country’s infamous dictator, Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier, who came to power in a 1956 military coup. The Duvalier family depended on the armed forces to remain in power for decades. “Baby Doc” Jean-Claude Duvalier, Francois’ son, became president in 1971 and ruled until 1986, when he fled the country amid protests and under U.S. pressure. A National Council of Government was formed, comprised of military officers, including General Henri Namphy and a number of civilians charged with facilitating the country’s return to democratic rule.

Haiti’s subsequent experiment with democracy was short-lived. In 1988 General Namphy overthrew the elected president, Leslie Manigat, and installed a civilian government under military control. Government control continued to switch between civilian and military leadership. In 1991, Brigadier General Raoul Cedras overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who had been elected the previous year. The country then witnessed a period of unrivaled brutality and the dire consequences of military rule. After several years of violence by the ruling junta, the military was pressured to relinquish control in 1994 amid fears of a U.S. military invasion (though the United States was criticized at the time for offering military leaders bribes, or “golden parachutes,” to resign). Ultimately, the Clinton administration deployed up to 20,000 Marines to oversee the return of pseudo-democracy, whereby Aristide was again nominally in control but hardly in a position to lead.

Nevertheless, even after the army was disbanded, former soldiers continued to sow instability, as exemplified by the 2004 violence that toppled President Aristide during his second presidential term. In March of that year, rebel leader Guy Philippe told journalists that he was the new head of Haiti’s military: “I am the chief…the military chief.” A former police chief from 1995 to 2000, Philippe had links to drug trafficking in the country and was allegedly among the masterminds of an attempted uprising in December 2001.

Why an Army?

Calls for the reconstitution of Haiti’s military have escalated considerably since the country’s devastating 2010 earthquake. The 7.2-magnitude quake struck the island just as Haiti was beginning to establish some kind of internal stability after Aristide’s 2004 overthrow and to prepare for congressional elections. Thousands died in the earthquake. The natural disaster exhausted the capabilities of the Haitian government as well as the capabilities of the UN Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH). The challenges they faced immediately after the quake included dealing with internal security issues like looting, assembling security units to provide aid to civilians and to protect sensitive areas, and apprehending the 5,000 prisoners that had escaped from the national penitentiary, as well as neutralizing gangs and stemming the tide of street crime.

Even before the quake, Haiti suffered from a number of internal security issues, like drug trafficking and rampant corruption within the Haitian police force. It is unclear how widespread the consumption of cocaine and other illegal drugs is in Haiti, but the island of Hispaniola certainly serves as a major transit point for drugs coming from South America to the United States or Europe. In June 2005, Haiti’s former national police commander, Rudy Therassan, pleaded guilty to offering to protect Colombian cocaine shipments in the country. He was sentenced to almost 15 years in prison. Similarly, in early May 2007, the police in Port-de-Paix arrested nine individuals suspected of involvement in illicit drug trafficking, seizing more than 200 kilograms of cocaine.

The question remains: why should Haiti reinstitute a military force instead of investing in a better police force or a national constabulary? Countries like Panama and Costa Rica have achieved reasonable success in dealing with internal security issues despite their lack of militaries. Furthermore, considering the generally stable relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in recent years, where would an external security threat to Haiti originate? Interstate combat between the two countries remains highly implausible. In fact, after the earthquake struck, the Dominican Republic sent up to 150 troops to join MINUSTAH to help with rescue and relief operations. A February 2010 report in The Wall Street Journal noted that less than 48 hours after the earthquake struck, Dominican President Leonel Fernández met with then-Haitian President Rene Préval in the Haitian capital in a demonstration of solidarity.

To be fair, suggestions about reinstating the armed forces in Haiti have come not only from disgruntled former Haitian soldiers. Shortly after the 2010 earthquake struck, a former U.S. diplomat to Haiti, Ambassador William Jones, argued on CNN that disbanding the army “was a mistake because whenever you have a natural disaster such as this, the first thing we do is to call out the national guard. Well, there is no national guard in Haiti. There is no army. There is no force that can be deployed throughout Port-au-Prince to bring order. And without order it [will] be very, very difficult to coordinate the aid program.” Supporters of restoring the Haitian military also argue that it would help bolster the government’s internal control of the country, enforce the rule of law, provide security in the event of another disaster, and offer a source of employment and discipline to young Haitians.

The Need for Security

Reinstituting the military would be no easy task. Besides the political issues, there are basic logistical and financial components that must be overcome, something that the Canadian International Development Agency learned a decade ago. At the time, the Canadians were trying to train Haitian security forces at the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) facilities in Regina, Saskatchewan. Speaking about the initiative in the mid-1990s, Timothy Donais, a Wilfrid Laurier University professor who has studied police reform in Haiti, explained to the Canadian National Post that you cannot simply provide six months of basic training to police officers, send them out into the street, and expect them to be police officers in the vein of the RCMP. He observed, “It’s easy to teach people the technical skills. It’s much harder to change the culture of a police organization.”

Moreover, if a Haitian military is reconstituted, the nation’s youth will be expected to make up its rank and file, but filling senior officer positions presents a greater challenge. One option may be to reinstate former officers who served until 1995 when the military was disbanded, but this would be an extremely risky move considering the former military’s propensity for coups.

In addition, Haiti remains a poor country, and unfortunately its economic situation is unlikely to improve in the near future. Hence, the government will have to focus its small budget on providing relief, reconstituting state services, and rebuilding infrastructure. A Haitian military — or a bigger police force, coast guard, or border patrol — could most likely come only from international aid, including the donation of equipment.

Haiti’s internal security issues and the possibility of future natural disasters make it a priority for the country to have well-trained and well-prepared security forces. But there is no logical reason to re-establish an army, as the training and weaponry soldiers require are simply not necessary for Haiti’s security needs. It would be much more advantageous for Haiti to devote its limited budget to improving the judiciary, the police, the coast guard, and special units, including border guards and prison security officials. There is reason to believe that the government is somewhat committed to this path. In late May, Reginald Delva, the secretary of state for public security and Mario Andresol, the director of the National Police, visited two specialized units of the National Police, CIMO and SWAT TEAM. The government officials promised new uniforms and vehicles, as well as the construction of new police stations, though it’s unclear when these promises can be fulfilled.

Armies are not trained for internal security, but rather for inter-state warfare. When they are deployed internally, human rights abuses usually occur. To patrol the streets of Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, or Jeremie, Haiti does not need a soldier with a machine gun on every corner, but rather properly trained and equipped police that know the national laws, as well as a detective corps that can carry out investigative work. In addition, Haiti would greatly benefit from a larger coast guard to patrol the country’s territorial waters for drug traffickers and smugglers.

In addition, these specialized security forces would have the advantage of providing employment to thousands of Haitians, which is particularly important in a country where high unemployment has exacerbated crime levels.

The key challenge to developing an effective security force is not one of training and equipment, but of creating a chain of command that has integrity and is loyal to elected rulers. The last thing Haiti needs is an unreliable security force that could sow future instability and undermine Haiti’s already fragile democratic society.

The U.S. Role

American personnel deployed after the earthquake have long left Haiti and returned to the United States. The question that remains is how MINUSTAH and the Haitian police will work together to keep the country under control in coming years. Ongoing protests near the UN mission after an outbreak of cholera (apparently caused by UN peacekeepers), along with accusations of rape by Uruguayan peacekeepers, have further aggravated popular discontent with MINUSTAH.

It is unclear how long MINUSTAH will remain in Haiti, and there are signs that some donor countries, particularly Brazil, are losing interest in this operation. If MINUSTAH leaves Haiti, it will be up to the government in Port-au-Prince and its security forces to monitor the country, both internally and externally. It is unlikely that Haiti’s police alone can deal with these issues in the near future, which may encourage the Haitian government to yield to the pressure of former soldiers to reconstitute the army. Whatever the country decides, Port-au-Prince will have to rely on international aid.

Haiti is an independent nation and its government can carry out whatever security initiatives it sees fit, free from the intervention of foreign powers. Nevertheless, if the army is reconstituted, Washington should set strict limits on the kind of assistance it is willing to offer Port-au-Prince. For example, instead of military advisors, Washington could offer police advisors or decommissioned cutters and other vessels to improve the capabilities of Haiti’s coast guard. It would then be up to the Haitian government whether to accept or refuse this aid.

The United States has a controversial and problematic history with Haiti. But by limiting the amount of military-related aid it is prepared to give Port-au-Prince for internal stability, Washington would go a long way toward helping avoid future tensions in the troubled Caribbean state.

W. Alejandro Sánchez is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and a research fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs where he focuses on international security and geopolitical issues. His personal blog can be found by clicking here.
http://wasanchez.blogspot.com/

About the author:
FPIF

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ARTICLE - PRES. SECURITY CHIEF DISMISSED

PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY CHIEF, CAREL ALEXANDRE DISMISSED
(Defend Haiti) -

PORT-AU-PRINCE - Pierre Leon St-Remy Junior was appointed coordinator of the Presidential Security Unit (USP) to replace Alexandre Carel, said Wednesday a source close to the Presidency.

Pierre Leon St-Remy Junior, a relative of the First Lady, replaced Carel Alexandre through a change that would have been imposed by Washington determined to bring down several former police officers close to Michel Martelly, who are considered human rights offenders involved in drug-trafficking.

Officially, no reason has been advanced to justify this change. However, according to some reliable sources, it would be the result of intense pressure from representatives of the international community, particularly the United States, insisting that President Michel Martelly gets rid of some former police officers who have a bad reputation.

The new head of the USP Unit - close security of the Head of State- is a relative of the First Lady, Sophia Saint-Remy.

The sidelining of Carel Alexander, former head of the company to maintain order (CIMO), has not pleased others responsible for presidential security, the sources said.

A few months ago, the National Network of Human rights (RNDDH) expressed serious concerns to President Martelly, facing the reintegration into his security team or the National Police of several former commissioners returned for many years and particularly suspected of involvement in drug trafficking and human rights violations. The human rights organization had specifically named Carel Alexandre, Godwork Noel, Gilbert Dragon, Jacky Nau and Will Dimanche.

Will Dimanche became the meantime the head of the central management of the traffic police (DCPR).

ARTICLE - REBU - GENERAL STAFF "PHANTOM"

THE FORMER COLONEL HIMMLER REBU SPEAKS OF A GENERAL-STAFF "PHANTOM"
(Haiti Libre) -

Given the situation that confronts the Government following the occupation of former bases of FAd'H, by armed men in fatigues, claiming to be demobilized former soldiers, the former Colonel Himmler Rébu, leader of the Grand Rally for the Evolution of Haiti (GREH) declared "...As a former Colonel of the Army of Haiti which has always been against any disorder; intellectual, political or tactical, on the ground,.... I say clearly what is happening here, is an unacceptable disorder [...] We are saying to the President Michel Joseph Martelly, that he is today the Head of State [...] There is a mess, and he can not pretend not to know that the men are armed. He can not tell us today, that he does not know how they are armed, because it would make him even more irresponsible. He must resolve this issue with these men, and we are in a waiting position... The first Haitian, whose blood will be paid by an action of force decided by the current leadership, will lead us into a situation of global disorder [...]

Certainly, there is a General-Staff 'Phantom', that has decided a logistics plan, for the supply of these men; of arms, equipment, uniforms and food. There is certainly a General-Staff 'Phantom', and we want to get out of this underground state.

The army must be a regular national force, according to the standards prescribed by the Constitution, and outside of the will of one man or of a group of men, who today have only the possibility of recognizing that they are wrong, and have the duty to do their 'mea culpa', so that they are not themselves led in the wave that is coming [...] These men represent a symbol. Their struggle does not presume that tomorrow they will be part of the Army Forces of Haiti, but the meaning of their actions reminds all of us, that we have a duty to drive out of the fields of the Haitian Fatherland, those who today make a trade of the insecurity, the trade of fake elections for over 25 years, since President Jean-Claude Duvalier left power [...]

The Haitian Nation is trapped in an international trade of political instability, and of internal insecurity, so that Latin American soldiers can strut with weapons in hand [on Haitian territory], at a cost of nearly $1.5 million per day, at the price of the misery and of the indignity to which we have all plunged..."

On the sidelines of a conference of political parties, Mirlande Manigat on the subject of the occupation of the former bases of FAd'H, doubted that they are only former demobilized soldiers, and she describes the non-intervention of the National Police of Haiti, as a malfunction of the State "...You say there are demobilized soldiers... Firstly, I'm not sure that they are only demobilized soldiers who are here today. Secondly, they are armed, have new uniforms, new boots, new weapons. We can ask the question to know who is behind them? Now there is another problem that arises, that of the defiance to the authority of the state. If a Minister gives the order to evict them and the police says that they will not, because it is not their role, and does not have the means to do it... this is a serious problem of the malfunctioning of the state..."